











































Ephemeral infrastructures of drug smuggling mobilities
Citation for published version:
Guerrero C, J & Martin, C 2021, 'Ephemeral infrastructures of drug smuggling mobilities', Contemporary
Drug Problems. https://doi.org/10.1177/00914509211045598
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1177/00914509211045598
Link:






The final version of this paper has been published in Contemporary Drug Problems, Vol/Issue, Month/Year by
SAGE Publications Ltd, All rights reserved. © Javier Guerrero C and Craig Martin, year of publication. It is
available at: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00914509211045598
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 22. Dec. 2021
1 
 Ephemeral Infrastructures of Drug Smuggling Mobilities 
Abstract: 
The study of drug smuggling has often taken an organizational perspective whereby the 
structures of how smuggling is constituted predominate. Building on a growing body of 
scholarship addressing the networked complexities of drug smuggling this article 
considers the importance of distinct infrastructural arrangements. Its primary focus is on 
the materiality of drug smuggling infrastructures, and how the social, spatial and 
temporal qualities of these configurations overlap with licit mobility infrastructures, 
including intersections of visibility/invisibility, stability, and permanence. The core 
conceptual premise, drawn from Science and Technology Studies, is that drug 
smuggling mobilities are formed of ephemeral infrastructures that exhibit temporary, 
short-lived stability and permanence through the subversion of licit infrastructural 
configurations. Drawing on material from El Dorado Airport, Colombia, the paper 
examines the everyday artefacts which constitute these ephemeral infrastructures. 
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There is no doubt that since Star (1999) issued her call for the study of ‘boring things,’ 
namely the mundane issue of infrastructure, a broad range of scholars from a wide 
array of disciplinary backgrounds, including geographers, anthropologists, and scholars 
in Science and Technology Studies (STS) have established the study of infrastructure 
as an object for the social sciences in its own right. On the other hand, scholarly interest 
in drug trafficking already has a long tradition within several disciplines, including social 
and economic history, criminology, sociology, anthropology, political sciences, law, and 
a foothold in what Gootenberg (2005) terms ‘drug studies.’ However, until recently, the 
two branches of scholarship have seldom crossed paths. 
Whilst scholars such as Decker and Chapman (2008) have provided in-depth accounts 
of smugglers’ tactics and the wider processes of creating illicit supply chains, others, 
including Martin (2019) and Guerrero C (2019) have addressed the infrastructural 
dimensions of smuggling from a socio-material perspective. In this article, we offer new 
insights into infrastructural readings of drug smuggling by addressing the temporal 
dimensions of such practices in combination with materialist perspectives. We utilize the 
concept of ephemerality to differentiate the infrastructures of drug smuggling from those 
of licit infrastructural formations where their socio-material configurations are created on 
a permanent basis through both stability and embeddedness. In contrast, the article 
argues that drug smuggling infrastructures have the ability to move in and out of 
embeddedness on a temporary basis, whereby the mobility of illicit drugs rests on 
arrangements that are ephemeral because they rely on harnessing licit infrastructural 
mobility. We highlight the co-productive relations between the short-lived infrastructural 
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configurations of licit tourist mobilities and the security of infrastructures. Different from 
other semi-permanent infrastructures of drug mobilities, such as makeshift dockyards 
and airstrips, the short-lived infrastructural configurations of the mobilities of illicit drugs 
through the hyper-securitized space of the airport is composed of the bodies of drug 
mules alongside adapted tourist artefacts such as luggage.  
Although studies of networked organized crime tend to be well developed to analyze the 
roles and character of current organized crime (Kenney, 2007; Williams, 2001), the 
materialities of smuggling have remained somewhat black-boxed. More than attending 
to the dynamics of specific networks, this article adopts a network ontology approach 
that aims to transcend the dualisms of criminological literature such as local/global, 
legal/illegal, and human/non-human actors (Hall, 2018). As such the networks (made up 
of people and things) are performative. That is, their stability is only the result of the 
constant work of a vast array of actors. Power does not emanate from specific actors 
rather from the circulation of relationships (Latour, 2005). In this vein, Abraham and van 
Schendel (2005) have already shown the overlap between the legal and illegal in 
movements considered illegal, and Lupsha (1981) has investigated legal businesses’ 
connections with various forms of criminality. However, although they describe the 
complex dynamics in criminal organizations and illuminate their socio-economic 
characteristics and certain structural qualities, they leave out the more situated, local 
and material experiences of how these organizations act. This article engages with 
these aspects. 
We develop our argument by providing a temporal-material reading of drug mobilities, 
connecting different strands of literature, including STS readings of materiality and 
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infrastructure and geographies of the illicit and organized crime. We also employ 
discourses from ‘the mobilities turn’ and reflections on the material character of different 
mobilities (Hannam et al., 2006; Urry, 2007). As a case study we analyze the material 
arrangements involved in attempts to transport drugs using commercial airlines from El 
Dorado airport in Bogotá (Colombia) in order to demonstrate the materialities of drug 
trafficking. Mobility studies have focused mostly on legal mobilities, there are incursions 
on how various forms of mobility, legal and illegal, are intertwined (Martin, 2015, 2019). 
Likewise, several contributions have emphasized the socio-technical systems 
configured as forms of control and classification of legal and illegal flows (Adey, 2004; 
Sheller, 2010). Cohen et al., (2017) have been more specific still in developing what 
they call ‘subversive mobilities’. They discuss the need to open the ‘black box’ on the 
ways artifacts are integrated into these networks. Similarly, Bess and Enciso (2017) 
propose the study of ‘drug mobilities’ to understand the convergences of movement, 
technology, and organizational control for mobility studies and transport history, with the 
scholarship on the drugs trade. Likewise, Urry (2005) argues for the importance of the 
movement of illegal or clandestine things in understanding mobilities. Together these 
intersecting and overlapping mobilities help shape the economic and political dynamics 
of the contemporary world (Martin, 2015, 2019; Nordstrom, 2007). 
The airport itself has been an important site for such studies as well as producing 
debates about airport security technology’s political and social aspects in addition to the 
co-construction of such technologies. This literature recognizes both the material 
element of security concerns and highlights the importance of materiality, but seldom 
does it engage with the objects, people, and materials considered security threats, inter 
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alia, the smuggler. The emphasis on the material aspects of drug trafficking through a 
combination of the theoretical propositions of mobility studies, infrastructure studies, 
and STS allows us to move from the excessive focus on organizational arrangements 
common in the explanation of drug trafficking, that still rely on the tropes of ‘cartels’ and 
‘syndicates’ (see Reuter & Paoli, 2020; Tonry & Reuter, 2020) and instead address the 
distinct materialities of infrastructural arrangements. Finally, the paper engages the 
literature on illicit flows where the contrast between forms of visibility and invisibility is 
also more evident. While the state makes efforts to achieve visibility and guarantee 
territorial sovereignty, traffickers seek to remain invisible (Abraham & van Schendel, 
2005). 
In section one we discuss the turn to the materialities of infrastructure and specifically 
contributions from the STS literature. STS as a field has demonstrated the interplay 
between Science, Technology and Security (Evans et al., 2020; Vogel et al., 2017) and 
specifically Actor Network Theory has been utilized to explore issues related to security, 
flagging the mutual constitution of security assemblages, including the contested role of 
technology and security threats (Andersson, 2015; Braun et al., 2019;). The second 
section accounts for the theoretical affinity between, STS, infrastructural studies and the 
new mobilities paradigm. Here the core arguments on infrastructural arrangements are 
developed, the intention being to identify the key traits of large-scale infrastructure, 
namely: visibility and invisibility; permanence; embeddedness; and maintenance. 
Section three presents an overview of the drug smuggling mobilities. In section four we 
develop our positioning of the ephemeral infrastructure of drug smuggling and how they 
relate the conditions of large-scale licit infrastructure, deploying similar traits albeit for 
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short-lived periods of time. Section five offers a more empirically grounded outline 
through a consideration of drug smuggling encounters at El Dorado Airport, Colombia. 
We look at the actions of the so-called pasantes or ‘drug mules’ and at the mundane 
objects (such as luggage). In the Conclusion we summarize the value of analyzing the 
ephemeral infrastructures of drug smuggling so as to understand illicit mobility flows. 
Methodologically, the article draws on ethnographic observation alongside semi-
structured and in-depth interviews with members of the Colombian Police at El Dorado 
Airport. The article combines these social research methods with broader STS theories, 
explicitly with the biographies of technologies and practices (BoTP) (Hyysalo et al., 
2018), in our attempt to follow the movement of illicit drugs. The article is based on 
fieldwork undertaken by one of the authors between 2014 and 2015, and interviews with 
anti-narcotics personnel between 2017 and 2018. The co-author carried out fieldwork at 
CIENA, the Center for intelligence and Analysis of the Colombian Antinarcotic Police, 
the offices of which are within the premises of El Dorado Airport. The researcher was 
provided with access to the annex building where suspicious cargo is sorted and 
allowed to shadow police personnel when surveying passengers at the first check in 
point in the airport, and to observe the work of the police in charge of the early 
judicialization of the pasantes. The interviews and fieldwork were analyzed using a 
coding scheme developed during data collection. Given our interest in the engagements 
of both drug smugglers and Colombian Police with the infrastructural dimensions of 
drug trafficking there is an inevitable messy quality to such overlaps, so to deal with this 
we have focused on the binary practices/technologies deployed in the mobilities of drug 
trafficking. We recognize that in doing so we focus our attention on the 'unsuccessful' 
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drug smuggler, but this also reveals the materiality of such practices. The appearance 
and disappearance of the materials used for the transportation of drugs from our data 
(interviews, documents, statistics, observations), allowed us to problematize and 
develop our main hypothesis, chiefly the ephemeral character of the infrastructures of 
drug smuggling. 
1. STS and Infrastructural materialities 
STS as a discipline is focused on the production and maintenance of technological 
artifacts. STS bridges the distinction between the ‘social’ and the ‘technical,’ studying 
the interconnectedness between them, using the language of co-production (Jasanoff, 
2004), social construction (Pinch & Bijker, 1984) and mutual shaping (MacKenzie & 
Wajcman, 1999). Several strands within STS deal directly with infrastructures where 
they are understood as sociotechnical assemblages, revealing they are more than 
purely technical constructs. Since the mid-1990s, STS scholars have presented 
infrastructures as layered, complex, changing, modular increments, and in constant 
negotiation with other system aspects (Star & Ruhleder, 1996). STS has demonstrated 
the paradoxical condition of infrastructure. Highly immobile infrastructures such as 
airports, or roads aimed at facilitating large scale movements are at the same time 
highly local and intimate; that is, rigid but also requiring softer human skills, 
competencies, and expectations (Howe et al., 2016). 
While different STS strands have engaged with materiality, actor-network theory (ANT) 
associated with Bruno Latour, Michell Callon, and John Law is the version of STS that 
provides the most complete set of conceptual and methodological tools to deal with 
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materiality. Actor-network theory is preoccupied with how materials and meanings are 
interwoven, and how realities only exist in practices: to ANT materiality is inseparable 
from its practices (Law, 2012). Materiality is understood as a relational effect, where 
“knowledge and realities are being continuously enacted or performed” (Law, 2012, p. 
179). ANT scholars trace how the stability of the material is achieved through the 
continuous work of actors assembling heterogeneous networks composed of discursive, 
institutional, technological materials. In consequence, part of the scholarly endeavor 
reveals how the particular material assemblages are made detectable (Law, 2012, p. 
173). 
As we go on to suggest we are interested in the constitutive effects between the 
infrastructures of drug smuggling and the airport and its security infrastructure. In doing 
so, we move away from explanations that consider the technologies used by drug 
smugglers as resources to be deployed according to their efficiency, for, as STS 
reminds us, different aspects of problems are given priority and particular solutions 
“rendered thinkable” (Beck et al., 2017, p. 1064). Our focus then is not on any specific 
salient technology, rather, under the auspices of what we term ephemeral 
infrastructures, the semi-stable arrangements that produce drug smuggling materialities. 
Overarchingly, there is one particular analytical insight from STS/ANT that we consider 
specifically relevant for the study of drug trafficking networks. Despite the constant work 
and planning involved in the development of legal infrastructure, they are always a work 
in progress, always in continuous negotiation. As such infrastructural stability is 
constantly strived for through an ongoing process of ongoing dialogue with instability. In 
9 
dialogue with this we argue that the ephemerality of drug smuggling infrastructures 
creates a transitory, quasi-stable state of affairs. 
2. The mobility of infrastructural arrangements 
As with infrastructures, the social sciences have often dealt with mobility as a black box 
(Sheller & Urry, 2006, p. 208). To the mobilities paradigm, mobility implies immobile 
infrastructures that facilitate or impede movement (Cook & Butz, 2016; Hannam et al., 
2006, p. 11). To be sure, there is no mobility without systems of immobility. Mobility is 
always located and materializes through the rearrangement of places. The 
infrastructures that facilitate or impede mobility are subject to a set of feedback 
mechanisms and are, according to the mobilities paradigm, the result of a combination 
of objects, technologies, and socialities that produce patterned relationships. In short, 
infrastructures of mobility are materially heterogenous sociotechnical systems, which 
possess emergent properties that should be studied as hybrids in all their complexity. 
For our argument there are four key determinants that constitute the spatial, temporal 
and material qualities of large-scale infrastructural forms: (in)visibility; permanence; 
embeddedness; and background work. Using these key tropes our intention is to 
establish how they form the ontological configuration of infrastructure, as well as the 
ground upon which we articulate our central premise of the ‘ephemeral infrastructures’ 
of drug smuggling. 
We begin with perhaps a key point for our argument – the intersection of visibility and 
invisibility. Star’s (1999) seminal work on infrastructures provides an array of important 
contexts for their study, not least the metaphorical notion of infrastructure’s ‘buried’ 
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qualities. Part of the mundanity of infrastructure, its seemingly boring nature, results 
from being apparently invisible (Star & Ruhleder, 1996). For Law infrastructure elicits 
the question of how we engage with that which “lies beneath the social surface?” (Law, 
1991, p. 10-11). Partly as a result of infrastructure’s buried qualities it has been taken-
for-granted, whereby it remains invisible and black-boxed (Graham & Thrift, 2007, p. 10; 
Star & Ruhleder, 1996, p. 112). This invisible quality of infrastructure stems in part from 
usage, when infrastructures work, they are ostensibly invisible, only when they fail and 
breakdown do they become visible (Star, 1999, p. 382). However, Dourish and Bell 
(2007), and Dodge and Kitchin (2004) have argued that the question of invisibility is 
contextual or relational. That is, it is dependent on both the nature of the infrastructure 
itself but also who is using it. To circle back to Leigh Star’s assertion, it is once again 
dependent on who is using the infrastructure. It is clear then that a straightforward 
binary separation of invisible or visible is doubtful. Above all, we concur with Larkin’s 
observation that “invisibility is certainly one aspect of infrastructure, but it is only one 
and at the extreme edge of a range of visibilities that move from unseen to grand 
spectacles and everything in between” (Larkin, 2013, p. 335). The notion of material and 
temporal permanence we associate with large scale infrastructure is again relational. 
That is, permanence and stability depend upon a vast array of actors to instantiate 
longevity. As Graham and Marvin (2001, p. 182) highlight, there is a huge amount of 
background work undertaken to create the veneer of permanence and fixity. Employing 
the term ‘precarious achievements’ Graham and Marvin go on to articulate how dynamic 
the process is of maintaining the operation of networks, so that they remain perceivably 
stable, fixed and permanent. 
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A similar argument is true when we consider the role of embeddedness. Taking our cue 
once again from Leigh Star’s work, infrastructure is said to be embedded within and 
alongside other infrastructures, “social arrangements, and technologies” (Star, 1999, p. 
381). Critical to this notion of embeddedness is that constituent elements of 
infrastructure are nested in place, fixed together as part of a stable assemblage. 
Employing the analogy of water infrastructure, we could argue that the pipework is 
embedded within the wider socio-technical network. In this image the notion of fixity is 
alluring for we understandably perceive the pipework as a stable entity embedded 
alongside other key elements such as pumps, filtration units, etc. The attraction of such 
images comes in part from the materiality of these infrastructural forms, what Graham 
and Thrift (2007, p. 10) describe as “hard technologies”. This is why infrastructural 
embeddedness is often discussed in parallel with permanency. Two interrelated 
material and temporal factors emerge: firstly, the materiality of infrastructure (its 
hardness) creates a sense of permanence and material resilience; secondly, the 
persistence of infrastructural longevity over time is promoted. 
To be sure, infrastructures operate through the conjunction of dynamic background 
work which maintains the appearance of stability and permanence, or what Adey 
describes as obduracy (Adey, 2006, p. 76). That is, there is a kind of stubborn, enduring 
quality to how we think of infrastructures as embedded sociotechnical systems. For 
example, in the case of large-scale transport infrastructures these are socio-technical 
platforms for the mobility of people and objects (Larkin, 2013), created through the 
intersection of both highly mobile and highly immobile infrastructures where mobility is 
produced by immobile infrastructural forms – think of the seeming fixity of road 
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networks. This blurs the distinctions between movement and materiality; fixity and 
fluidity. This blurring is acute in the study of transport infrastructures that include 
logistical supply chains (Birtchnell & Böhme, 2020; Birtchnell & Urry, 2015), 
securitization of mobility and global flows of people and things (Beauchamps et al., 
2017; Leese & Wittendorp, 2018) and the intersection between migration studies and 
mobilities (Pooley, 2017; Thimm & Chaudhuri, 2019). 
Much of the value of the new mobilities literature stems then from the recognition that 
mobilities are not solely concerned with movement, rather how movement is created by 
immobilities and the enduring qualities of the moorings which effectively configure 
movement (Hannam et al., 2006). So, just as large-scale infrastructure is relational, 
mobilities too are configured by heterogeneous assemblages, and the definition of 
infrastructure provided by Larkin – “infrastructures are matter that enable the movement 
of other matter” (Larkin, 2013, p. 329) – provides a conceptual bridge to understand 
infrastructure more generally as the mobilization of matter. 
3. Drug smuggling mobilities 
The differential nature of mobility as outlined in the new mobilities paradigm leads us 
onto the relationship between licit large-scale material infrastructures and the illicit 
infrastructures of drug trafficking. As with the coextensive nature of infrastructures 
discussed above, we argue that drug smuggling infrastructures are framed by parallel 
questions of visibility/invisibility, embeddedness, permanence and background 
maintenance. Central to this is the relationship between longevity and ephemerality: 
where licit infrastructural configurations are often determined by the strivance for 
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permanent operation through ongoing upkeep and maintenance, we recognize 
something distinct in the infrastructures of drug smuggling mobilities, namely their 
temporary configuration. But before beginning to unpack our notion of ‘ephemeral 
infrastructures’ of drug smuggling in the next section, we briefly discuss the larger-scale 
material infrastructures of drug smuggling. 
The genealogy of drug smuggling is historically and geographically complex, with 
historians (Harvey, 2016) noting its inherent relationship with legal trade, as well as the 
politics of the time, including the case of the opium trade in the late 19th century and 
early 20th century where this once-legitimate commodity became illegal (Meyer and 
Parssinen, 1998, p. 2-4). Likewise, the imbrication of the licit and illicit is evident in the 
infrastructures of drug smuggling that are dependent on socio-material affordances of 
infrastructural technologies. In this context Martin (2019) suggests that the practices of 
smugglers fall into two categories. Firstly, shadow networks and supply chains; 
secondly, harnessing legitimate transportation networks and supply chains1. These two 
differentiated strategies are dependent on infrastructural embeddedness and 
interdependencies. 
With the former, shadow infrastructural arrangements are created that run parallel to licit 
infrastructures. For example, drug traffickers acquire vehicles and other devices on the 
legal market, such as boats, light aircraft, communication devices, which can be used 
with or without modifications. Go-fast boats were common in the 1980s for transporting 
 
1 Cohen et al., (2017) propose a roughly similar division, but they focus on defining mobility through 
consideration of independent and parasitic routes, rather than the infrastructural aspects of smuggling 
practices. 
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drugs from Colombia, the Bahamas and Cuba to the USA (Decker & Townsend 
Chapman, 2008, p. 69). In the 1990s different infrastructural arrangements were 
deployed through the use of private light aircraft which departed and landed on 
makeshift airstrips. Two further infrastructural innovations highlight the creation of 
shadow networks and supply chains. The creation of drug-tunnels running between 
Mexico and the USA have been relatively common in the last few years (Associated 
Press, 2016). In terms of technological innovation, the case of agile infrastructure in the 
form of the design and build of narco-submarines and fast boats is particularly striking 
(Guerrero C, 2020). 
By no means mutually exclusive from the first, the second infrastructural formation 
outlined by Martin (2019) is the co-opting of existing licit infrastructures associated with 
commercial travel routes or the supply chains of global trade. Perhaps the most 
common of these is “piggybacking” (Basu, 2013, p. 316) on legitimate freight 
transportation networks, notably by concealing narcotics in intermodal shipping 
containers. Subversive tactics include the misrepresentation of the contents through 
false paperwork, or what is known as ‘double layering’, whereby shipments of narcotics 
are hidden behind consignments of legitimate freight. Cases of such tactical measures 
abound, but one brief example includes the seizure at the Port of Baltimore of USD $10 
million worth of cocaine hidden in black sports bags secreted inside a consignment of 
chairs (US Customs and Border Protection, 2019). In the case of utilizing commercial 
travel routes a similar process of piggybacking is apparent, most commonly with 
passengers or couriers smuggling drugs onboard scheduled commercial air routes, or 
other forms of transportation such as ferry services (see Caulkins et al., 2009). 
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 4. Towards an ephemeral infrastructure of drug smuggling 
Central to our conceptualization of the ephemeral infrastructures of drug smuggling 
mobilities is the transitory infrastructural arrangements in which drug smugglers align a 
disparate array of actors and systems to target the flow of drugs such as cocaine from 
production sites to consumers. Just as Xiang and Lindquist’s explanation of migration 
mobilities suggests, “migration flows can be fragmented and short-lived, but 
infrastructure retains a particular stability and coherence” (Xiang & Lindquist, 2014, p. 
132 our emphasis), we argue that drug smuggling mobilities are also stable and 
coherent, albeit for a shorter-lived period of time than regular mobilities, and, critically, 
that such stability is partly due to the ability to navigate in and out of embeddedness in 
legitimate infrastructures. A comparison with traditional logistics chains can help to 
visualize the argument more clearly. The logistics of trade flows rely on fixed departure 
and arrival times, where almost every movement is the result of control over movement, 
time, space and costs. These movements are sustained through infrastructural 
interconnectivity rendered functionally similar in different parts of the world, with 
incremental innovations over long periods. Levinson (2016) demonstrates the centrality 
of a technology, such as the shipping container, which has been central to the complex 
automated system of moving goods and services with stabilized forms of technological 
and systemic change. In this sense, licit goods and services follow more or less 
predictable, more or less stable routines over extended periods of time. We suggest that 
ephemeral infrastructures associated with drug smuggling lack the same predictability 
or ongoing stability; rather, by definition the transitory nature of ephemeral 
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infrastructures are temporary manifestations of embeddedness in legitimate mobility 
infrastructures. 
In both categories of drug smuggling mobilities outlined above different forms of 
temporary embeddedness operate. For clandestine, shadow infrastructures, whilst they 
operate out of the spaces of licit socio-material practices they nonetheless are 
dependent on existing knowledge, skills, and crucially technologies and mobile 
infrastructure such as adapted automobiles or boats, alongside transitory infrastructural 
formations like rural airstrips for example. The embeddedness we speak of here is the 
temporary form of stability afforded by the co-opting of such socio-technical artefacts 
and infrastructures. The smugglers’ tactics of piggybacking are likewise dependent on 
the existing material infrastructures of commercial supply chains or international travel, 
however there is something of a distinct temporality at work in these contexts. For whilst 
both systems of smuggling operate on a temporary basis--stable for briefer periods of 
time when compared with licit infrastructural configurations--their respective approaches 
to the socio-technologies means they act at different rates. In the case of drug 
smuggling tunnels for example, some estimates suggest that the cross-border tunnel 
developed to smuggle cocaine and marijuana between Tijuana and San Diego in 2016 
may have been operative for approximately 1-year (Associated Press, 2016). The 
economic investment, labor and time taken to dig the tunnel and construct the elaborate 
infrastructure replete with rail system and elevator necessitates as long an operation 
period as possible, albeit until discovered by security authorities. By piggybacking on 
existing supply chains and travel routes, enmeshing large-scale infrastructural forms 
such as shipping containers, or the smaller-scale mundane objects of tourist mobilities, 
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drug smugglers deploy a different form of ephemeral infrastructure that moves in and 
out of embeddedness in a comparatively fragmented and short-lived timeframe. 
As we will set out below, in the context of airports the ephemeral infrastructures of drug 
smuggling mobilities utilize the objects of tourist travel--adapted luggage, clothing, 
souvenirs--alongside using people’s bodies as infrastructure through the prevalence of 
drug mules (Simone, 2004)2. Such journeys are mediated by the ability of smugglers to 
harness the legitimate activities that produce aeromobilities (Cwerner et al., 2009), 
becoming embedded in the infrastructures of tourist travel for brief periods of time. By 
doing so, smugglers produce different infrastructural arrangements that rely upon the 
subversion of seemingly mundane objects of everyday travel which co-evolve according 
to the security mechanisms and the opportunities afforded by the airport and the 
distribution of resources within the smugglers’ networks. In short, the ephemeral 
infrastructures of drug smuggling mobilities are short-lived stable arrangements to 
distribute cocaine by moving in and out of infrastructural embeddedness, thus producing 
short-lived invisibility in relation to airport security.  
5. El Dorado Airport: a case study of the ephemeral infrastructures of drug 
smuggling 
To provide an empirical unpacking of the ephemeral qualities of drug smuggling 
infrastructures, in this final section we focus on the case of drug trafficking within the 
context of aeromobilities, specifically El Dorado Airport in Bogotá, Colombia. We 
 
2 Drug mules or more precisely body-packers deserve a discussion in their own right, however, to note 
that body-packers secrete drugs within their bodies using prepared condoms or the fingers of latex 
gloves, which can be considered a specific type of smuggling technology (Fleetwood, 2014). 
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describe the ephemeral infrastructures of drug smuggling through the security 
apparatus of the airport’s anti-narcotics police. Such security protocols and procedures 
in airports have been the subject of study in cognate disciplines, including surveillance 
studies, critical security studies, mobilities studies, and STS (see Salter, 2004). This 
literature recognizes both the material element of security and security concerns and 
highlights the importance of materiality in understanding security, however there is 
limited engagement with the objects, people, and materials that constitute the 
infrastructural arrangements of drug smuggling. We take the encounters of drug 
trafficking infrastructures within the airport to demonstrate the complexities of the 
material aspects of drug trafficking as it encounters the airport’s hyper-securitized 
space. While security in the airport implies a continued sorting of people and objects 
(Kloppenburg, 2013; Schouten, 2014; Valkenburg & Van der Ploeg, 2015), of what is 
allowed or not to travel, as well as the standardization of surveillance practices, drug 
trafficking infrastructures rely upon the subversion of the seemingly mundane objects of 
everyday travel, facilitated by our key proposition of the temporary stability of ephemeral 
infrastructures. 
El Dorado Airport is one of the largest airports in Latin America, with around 16,200 
international travelers passing through the airport on a typical day, and nearly 6 million 
per year by 20193. It employs circa 25,000 people, while approximately 102,000 people 
work in the aero industrial sector in Bogotá, 7% of total employment in the city. A private 
security company provides security in the airport, with more than 300 security agents 
controlling entry to the airport, together with an array of technologies, CCTV, metal 
 
3 https://eldorado.aero/comunicados/estadisticas-del-aeropuerto (Retrieved, 2/2/21).  
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detectors, X-rays, biometric scanners. Nevertheless, drug trafficking has been a 
significant factor in shaping the security of El Dorado. Since the 1980s the airport has 
been a critical transit point for the transportation of cocaine, adding an extra layer of 
security composed of police frisking, profiling, body scanning, a bag holding system, 
narcotic detection dogs, and a ‘reconciliation room’. In 2019, 249 persons were 
captured at El Dorado by the Colombian anti-narcotics police when trying to carry illicit 
drugs (mainly cocaine) overseas.4 The Colombian Police have deployed the Compañía 
Antinarcóticos de Control Aeroportuario with a dedicated unit inside El Dorado to detect 
suspicious passengers. 
El Dorado Airport’s security procedures begin when a passenger buys an airplane 
ticket; there are ‘critical destinations’ or ‘red flag’ countries and cities considered likely 
destinations for the arrival of illicit drugs5. As Salter (2004) has indicated, airport security 
implicates the pre-emption and categorization of people long before they enter the 
airport premises.6 The methods of how and where the ticket is purchased might signal a 
security concern; when and how the passenger acquired their passport; and the 
passenger’s travel history. If provided by the airline, the combination of the previous 
 
4 https://www.elespectador.com/bogota/en-2019-cayeron-249-personas-por-narcotrafico-en-el-
aeropuerto-el-dorado-article-897722/ (Retrieved, 30/12/19) 
5 Critical destinations are defined by previous years’ statistics, diplomatic exchanges, and intelligence 
information. In the field, often the phrase “wherever we might think they could be sending drugs” (mostly 
Europe) is used to define a critical destination.  
6 Countries worldwide have launched different interventions to strengthen capacities to face the alleged 
increased capabilities of drug trafficking organizations to overcome airport security to control illicit drug 
flows. Notably, since 2010, UNODC, INTERPOL, and the World Customs Organizations (WCO) created 
the AIRCOP program “to detect and intercept drugs, other illicit goods, and high-risk passengers in both 
origin, transit, and destination countries with the overall objective of disrupting the illegal criminal 
networks” (https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/AIRCOP/1-aircop-home.html, retrieved, 
2/2/21). A similar process of security pre-emption has been in use in the maritime industry, specifically the 
US Customs and Border Protection agency’s Container Security Initiative. Since its inception in 2002 the 
initiative pre-emptively screens shipping containers at their point of origin outwith US sovereign territory 
(see Office of Policy and Planning and Office of Internal Affairs, Container Security Division, 2006).  
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information is sifted and analyzed by the police looking for clues over which passengers 
are suspicious and should be questioned in more detail when they arrive at the airport. 
A second security layer is the deployment of police expertise in profiling, looking for 
critical signs of nervous behavior, details in the clothing, number of overhead 
compartments booked, and checked luggage, as well as the weight of luggage, and the 
use of stereotypes to filter those considered regular travelers and those who are not. 
Spotting suspicious behavior is done by police on the airport floor, or by police agents 
and airport security monitoring images from more than 700 cameras positioned around 
the airport. When the police believe a passenger is behaving suspiciously, they are 
approached either at the point of entry, or after the passport check and might be taken 
to a dedicated room with a BodyScan machine (BS 16), a machine that utilizes ionizing 
radiation to provide a full inspection of the passenger’s body.7 Security at the airport is 
negotiated between the private security company, diverse companies of the National 
police, immigration agents, customs agents, and several other ministries. 
The anti-narcotics company stationed at El Dorado Airport is one company out of twelve 
airports and port control of the Colombian National Police. The anti-narcotics police aim 
to anticipate the transit of illicit drugs throughout the airport, both at the smaller scale on 
commercial airplanes and at a much larger scale on cargo planes. When asked about 
the strategy’s efficiency, some members of the police are quick to dismiss the results 
and affirm that for every person identified as carrying cocaine, the smugglers send at 
least one other; the captured usually serving as a decoy. Others consider that this type 
 
7 According to the supplier, the BS 16 is an X-ray inspection equipment specifically developed for the 
inspection of people from head to toe in susceptible areas. It allows the detection of drugs, narcotics, 
contraband goods, weapons, explosives, hidden under clothing, inside prosthetics, or on the human body. 
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of experience plus the technologies have improved identification rates. Here it is worth 
considering the words of anti-narcotics agents in the airport concerning the strategies of 
drug organizations regarding the pasantes: “They care about the cargo, they do not 
care about the people…so they…send three 'mules,' and of those three, one is 
captured, so if they are losing too much, they will stop for some time and start again”8. 
The critical issue here is the body as part of the drug smuggling infrastructure and the 
encounter between such infrastructures and airport security. When a mule is identified 
the ephemeral, short-lived quality of the drug smuggling infrastructure becomes 
apparent, whereby the smuggling organizations pause their activities. The body of the 
pasante then reappears during anti-narcotics training: “Here the police personnel is 
taught to see the body, the whole body, how is the people dressed, what is the people 
doing, what looks at or not, the walking, the behavior, if there are doubts, if is talking or 
not, if the person is too timid or to brazen”9 As in any contemporary airport, the security 
in El Dorado Airport operates with a complex combination of new and old technologies, 
and the combination of visibility and invisibility. In the last decade, little has changed 
regarding the control of anti-narcotics, with the wide availability of 'Cocaine Drug Test 
Wipes' as one of the main innovations.10  
Despite the wide-ranging sophistication of the security apparatus in use at El Dorado 
airport (and others) we propose that the drug smugglers’ actions can be understood as 
resulting from the ephemeral, short-lived character of the infrastructures they configure 
 
8 Interview with anti-narcotics police commander at El Dorado airport, August 2015. 
9 Interview with anti-narcotics police analyst, June 2017.  
10 Interviews with non-commissioned officers with field experience in airport anti-narcotics control, August 
2016, and October 2018 
22 
to transport drugs, a process that is highly dependent on the subversion of everyday 
objects which are designed in such a way to enable them to be moved in and out of 
embeddedness in the licit infrastructures of aeromobilities. Given our earlier point 
concerning, the use of small-scale mundane objects such as luggage or adapted vests 
used by pasantes also limits the amount of cocaine that can be transported. The anti-
narcotics police attempt to identify micro transformations of mundane objects, 
sometimes carrying no more than 10 grams of cocaine. The concept of ephemeral 
infrastructures allows us to see the many micro-movements that uphold the movement 
of drugs from producers to consumers. Moving the cocaine from city to city, as well as 
moving the people and the artefacts, are highly dependent on the embeddedness of 
everyday mobility, as demonstrated by a pasante captured in El Dorado Airport: 
“When I was captured, something different happened. The suitcases had always 
been made by people from Cali. On this occasion, the drug owner asked other 
people to make suitcases...people without experience that didn’t know if the 
suitcases would pass the airport filters. Since I saw the suitcase, I noticed that it 
was bigger and different…” (Quiceno et al., 2014, pp. 58-59 cited in Benítez et 
al., 2017, translation by authors).  
As attested to in this quotation, when attempting to smuggle cocaine using the 
infrastructure of aeromobilities, the options open to smugglers are part of a longer 
genealogy: cocaine is transported through attachment to the body; swallowing capsules 
of cocaine; using luggage either with fake compartments or everyday objects contained 
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inside (souvenirs, gifts, toiletries, among others); inserted into the body;11 and cocaine 
modified so it can be impregnated in clothes or other materials (see McDermott & 
Power, 2005). Each of these methods imply different infrastructural arrangements to 
transport the cocaine from sites of production to market. We now turn to a range of 
examples which further unpack the ephemeral infrastructures of drug smuggling at El 
Dorado Airport.  
In September 2013, the Anti-Narcotics Police at the Airport captured a Canadian citizen 
trying to smuggle cocaine via a direct flight from Colombia to Canada. Owing to her 
suspicious behavior the passenger was discovered by the police to be wearing a fake 
belly made of latex, disguised to look similar to the size and shape of a woman’s 
stomach seven months into the course of pregnancy (figure 1). Two kilos of cocaine 
were discovered inside the prosthesis. The passenger pretended to be pregnant and to 
avoid the X-ray controls due to her apparent condition. As narrated by the commander 
of the Anti-Narcotics Police, the discovery of the fake belly was both the result of routine 
checks and the cunning of a policewoman. It was revealed that detection such as this 
was possible due to the profiling at the check-in area, especially by a recently pregnant 
policewoman. Some stable routines carried out by the police are the frisking of 
suspicious passengers. When approaching the checkpoint, the Canadian woman 
excused herself from the frisking due to her pregnancy. Nevertheless, the Colombian 
policewoman touched her belly and felt it was ‘cold’12). The police officer also noted the 
material’s strange quality. At this point, the x-rays were enrolled to dissolve the dispute 
 
11 Some extreme forms of this method of smuggling have been reported, with surgical methods employed 
to implant cocaine under the skin (CIENA, 2017) 
12 Interview with Anti-Narcotics Police station commander, February 2014.  
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between the passenger and the police. The Canadian woman refused to take the body 
scan test because of possible damages to her baby. The police in the site decided on a 
manual search, and the woman was led to a room where the prosthesis – attached to 
the back with Velcro – was removed and two kilos of cocaine discovered. In a follow-up 
interview several years later13 , it was confirmed that police never found either the 
owners of the cocaine or the makers of the prosthetics. While some police suggested 
the high craftsmanship in making the prosthesis pointed to local makers and the 
similarity with previous seizures, others suggested it was just bought online, adding 
another layer to the mobility of the materials traveling alongside the bodies and the illicit 
products. A warning was issued to the police personnel in the field to look out for more 
possible fake bellies full of cocaine. There has not been another case of fake pregnant 
bellies captured in El Dorado since. 
Suitcases appear to be the most common (or the easiest to spot) method used by drug 
organizations to transport drugs. Between 2014 and 2016 around 66% of the drugs 
captured in the El Dorado, used suitcases14. During the final week of February 2016, the 
Anti-Narcotics Police captured a total of five people trying to smuggle drugs to Europe 
using the double-bottom method of adapted luggage. According to the police, the 
interception resulted from profiling the passengers and their luggage, and the use of 
sniffer dogs.15 On the same flight, but unknown to each other, two of the people were 
captured because their suitcases were considered suspicious during the X-ray scan, 
 
13 Interview with a CIENA analyst, 2018. 
14 The Colombian Police don’t differentiate between double-bottom or other modifications of suitcases 
and carrying drugs using suitcases without modifications. Statistics after 2017 are less clear on the 
method of transport.  
15 In police parlance, sniffer dogs are called biosensors. 
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then retrieved from the conveyor belt and confirmed by sniffer dogs. The bags were 
taken to the ‘reconciliation room’ where, in their owners’ presence, the cocaine was 
found. On the route from Bogotá via Amsterdam to Milan, a 46-year-old man and an 18-
year-old woman, traveling separately on the same flight, were required to open their 
hand luggage of similar sports backpacks. The backpacks were found to be stiff, as 
opposed to the form and materiality of a regular sports bag. After inspection, the police 
found 1,456 grams of cocaine in the first backpack and 1,225 grams in the second. The 
third case was reported to have been discovered in the check-in area prior to boarding: 
sniffer dogs pointed to the luggage of a passenger and after inspection 1.2 kilos of 
cocaine was found in a double-bottom bag. Such bags are one of the most common 
transport methods of small quantities of cocaine, but as informed by the example 
presented previously, the fabrication of such double-bottom suitcases is carried out in 
different places by different suppliers. While different groups may have a preferred bag 
maker, they do not hesitate to change the provenance of the bags. The bags are moved 
from city to city, from the workshops where they are made or modified to the hotels or 
houses where their new carriers meet them.  
Here again, the encounter between this common method of drug transportation and 
airport security is far from straightforward. The double-bottom bags need to appear as 
regular bags, but crucially they have to be ‘attached’ to a seemingly legitimate tourist in 
order to appear as part of tourist mobilities. The double-bottom bags and the traveler 
need to pass the inspection of airport security, which depends on the coupling of police 
expertise and machines. Details such as an inappropriate watch, a worn-out shoe, 
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anything that doesn’t cohere, or the memory of the police in recalling some detail of a 
previous case can lead to detection.  
Compared with the prosthetic stomach, double-bottom suitcases or bags are far more 
common, and the methods of inspecting suitcases is explicitly written into the inspection 
manual for training new anti-narcotics police. In such an example, the infrastructure of 
smuggling acquires temporary stability whereby the design and adaptation of different 
types of luggage affords smugglers the opportunity to harness the mobilities of tourist 
infrastructure, namely the transportation of luggage. However, another form of 
temporary stability appears for the Anti-Narcotics Police when they recognize the 
materiality of adapted luggage. As we have argued earlier, a key condition of our 
rendering of ephemeral infrastructure is the constant movement in and out of stability 
and embeddedness. And in the same vein, smugglers are constantly utilizing new 
methods of adaptation and disguise to circumvent the knowledge of police. So, where a 
backpack or suitcase might have been detected another adapted artifact becomes part 
of the smugglers’ arsenal. 
In another case at El Dorado Airport police discovered a suitcase made of parts chiefly 
from processed and transformed cocaine. The cocaine was sufficiently altered to 
overcome X-ray inspection, where police are looking for suspicious colors or shapes, 
the standardized luggage sizes as a blueprint to identify suspicious cargo. In this 
situation, some of the parts of the suitcase were replaced with similar parts made from 
cocaine. The police seized the case due to a tip-off from an informant, and upon 
capture, the maker of the suitcases confessed to having fabricated such suitcases for 
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several different groups16. The fact these suitcases had successfully been used by 
several groups of smugglers points to our assertions regarding the temporary stability 
afforded by licit infrastructures of tourism. Given they were utilized for smuggling 
quantities of cocaine by these various groups they were embedded within the mobilities 
of the passengers carrying them, only to lose their temporary stability following the tip-
off to the Anti-Narcotics Police. Compared with the transit of vast amounts of licit tourist 
luggage through the airport which have an ongoing stability, these adapted suitcases 
are only momentarily embedded (prior to capture in this case).  
In December 2018 four people were captured whilst trying to travel to Spain from El 
Dorado carrying 16 kilos of cocaine divided among themselves and attached to their 
bodies. The four were traveling on their own but were part of the same group, as their 
tickets were bought with the same credit card, and travel documents were issued the 
same day. They accessed the airport at different times and sat apart in the lounge. 
Alerted by the booking details, police asked for an X-ray inspection, where the cocaine 
was found adhered to their bodies attached with parcel tape. Although not as infrequent 
as the ingenuity of prosthetics, capturing people with cocaine attached to their bodies is 
not a common occurrence.17 Although frisking is part of the security routine, the capture 
of people with drugs attached to their bodies is met with some amusement by security 
officials: “those are easier to spot, you can see that they walk or move funny, just the 
other day [a named police officer] captured a guy who was walking with his legs wide 
 
16 Interview with police analyst, March 2018. 
17 This method does not even account for 1% of seizures between 2014 and 2016, far less than the 30% 
of people captured who have ingested the illicit drugs (CIENA, 2017).  
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open, you didn’t even had to touch him to know he was carrying drugs”18. Once again, 
this highlights our argument that the smugglers’ infrastructures only achieve their 
potentiality if successfully embedded, where the materials, bodies, body language, and 
demeanor hold together as seemingly legitimate actors. While smugglers might attempt 
to disguise the transport of drugs in suitcases by hiding the characteristic smell using a 
more powerful scent (such as mixing the cocaine with ground coffee or pouring alcohol 
inside and outside the luggage), the body language of smugglers is vital to the police’s 
modes of detection.  
Based on these snapshots of smuggling activities uncovered by the police at El Dorado 
Airport, we argue that smugglers attempt to utilize the aeromobilities of the airport 
infrastructure, engaging with the infrastructural configurations proposed by Martin 
(2019) and Cohen et.al. (2017), through a process of negotiating embeddedness and 
interdependency in distinct ways. We can see how a shadow infrastructure is created, 
that of the technologies of deception demonstrated by the decoy stomach and the 
double-bottomed luggage. But unlike the singular use of shadow infrastructure seen 
with light aircraft or narco-submarines the propulsive force of the licit aeromobilities 
infrastructure potentially enables transnational distribution. It is the process of 
negotiating these shadow and extant infrastructures that we argue characterizes the 
ephemeral or short-lived nature of the drug smuggling infrastructure. Upon entering the 
airport infrastructure, smugglers posing as legitimate travelers, become invisible for a 
brief period of time by dint of their immersion in the regular flows of passengers. As a 
result, the stability of these passenger flows affords temporary stability for the 
 
18 Interviews with police analyst, April 2015 and September 2018. 
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smugglers for the specific period of time they are within the aeromobilities infrastructure, 
i.e., checking-in, on-flight, arrival at their destination. However, this stability is short-lived 
and, decisively, precarious as it co-evolves in relation to the continued presence of the 
airport security apparatus. 
Despite the continuous capture of people at El Dorado, the airport continues to be used 
as a passage point by drug smugglers. While the smugglers could attempt to 
circumvent this airport and create a shadow infrastructure, this can only be done at the 
expense of reconfiguring the entire drug smuggling infrastructure. As an anti-narcotics 
officer at the airport affirmed in an interview with one of the authors, “those 
organizations are specialized in transporting using this airport, they know what to tell the 
people transporting the drugs, which are the best moments, how to behave, where to 
walk”19. What is at play is how the infrastructural arrangements developed by the drug 
smugglers are configured through the use of bodies as infrastructures, luggage and 
decoys, and attached on a temporary basis to the regimes of passenger aeromobilities. 
Conclusion 
As with any other infrastructure, drug smugglers’ infrastructures require maintenance 
and the continuous enrollment of loose and unstable elements. Drug smugglers need to 
make sure that the infrastructure will hold under pressure; that adapted luggage with 
double compartments will pass inspection; that a latex prosthetic stomach will not be 
discovered by X-ray scanners; that the purchasing of tickets will evade airline and police 
 
19 Interview with anti-narcotics police analyst, June 2017.  
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scrutiny; that people will not look nervous or too brazen. In this way drug smuggling 
infrastructures exhibit the need for continual upkeep and development. In this regard 
one might deduce that both licit and illicit infrastructures exhibit similar forms of 
maintenance to produce stability. However, whilst the ongoing stability of licit 
infrastructures depends on such upkeep, the key contrast with the illicit infrastructures 
associated with drug smuggling is that they are by comparison temporary. The core 
distinction we make in this paper is that because of the ever-presence of security 
infrastructures, drug smuggling infrastructures are inevitably short-lived and thus 
ephemeral, hence our use of the empirical materials from the activities of the law 
enforcement agencies at El Dorado. Equally, whilst the decentralized nature of drug 
smuggling has long been recognized in relationship to the centralized configuration of 
security apparatuses such as those in operation at El Dorado Airport, this paper has 
offered a new framing of this relationship by identifying the spatial, material, and 
temporal dimensions of how drug smuggling infrastructures are configured in a short-
lived manner. Above all, our use of the term ephemeral is intended to posit the 
temporality of drug smuggling infrastructure, combined with the socio-material focus 
from STS and cognate fields. Although drug smuggling has been present within El 
Dorado since the 1980s, and is likely to continue, the empirical insights from the Airport 
demonstrate how the ephemeral infrastructure of drug smuggling mobilities coexist with 
other infrastructures, travelling in the same flows as tourist infrastructures (Walters, 
2018), albeit for truncated periods of time in comparison with licit mobilities. These are 
configurations of interlinked technologies, of a diverse array of actors that facilitate the 
mobility of drugs, and we suggest that one of the key contributions this paper offers to 
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drug studies and the wider literature on subversive mobilities and STS’s engagement 
with infrastructure is how the different temporalities of infrastructural stability and 
embeddedness helps to reconceptualize what is already known about the movement of 
drugs. By stating that drug smuggling infrastructures have the ability to move in and out 
of embeddedness, we argue, in part, that the phenomenon rests precisely on 
arrangements that are ephemeral and do not seek the creation of recognizable routines 
or standardized practices. As such there are moments of control over the mobility of the 
drugs, coupled with a large degree of uncertainty. Whilst smugglers might be able to 
control the initial phase of planning (buying tickets, arranging distribution of the illicit 
cargo, giving instructions), once the pasante enters the infrastructure of the airport – be 
it with a prosthetic stomach or a double-bottom suitcase – there is a temporary reliance 
on the infrastructural logic and stability of aeromobilities to successfully distribute the 
drugs to the next phase of the journey. 
In conclusion, this paper has argued for the interpretative possibilities opened-up when 
combining the theoretical affinities of STS, mobilities studies and infrastructural studies 
to better understand the mobilities of drug smuggling. We illustrate the contribution such 
fields can make to the study of drug trafficking networks by foregrounding the 
ontological shift produced when the infrastructures of drug smugglers are symmetrically 
analyzed with the infrastructures for the governance and securitization of airports (Adey, 
2004). We argue that despite recent research employing network approaches there is 
still a lack of engagement with the temporalities and materialities of the artefacts that 
are key to moving cocaine from sites of production to consumption. Ultimately, we 
define the ephemeral infrastructures of drug smuggling mobilities as temporary 
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arrangements to transport cocaine by shifting in and out of embeddedness within licit 
tourist infrastructure, as well as producing invisibility through the creation of small-scale 
infrastructural arrangements in relation to airport security. 
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